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We formulate a flexible micro-to-macro kinetic model which is able to explain
the emergence of income profiles out of a whole of individual economic interactions.
The model is expressed by a system of several nonlinear differential equations which
involve parameters defined by probabilities. Society is described as an ensemble
of individuals divided into income classes; the individuals exchange money through
binary and ternary interactions, leaving the total wealth unchanged. The ternary
interactions represent taxation and redistribution effects. Dynamics is investigated
through computational simulations, the focus being on the effects that different
fiscal policies and differently weighted welfare policies have on the long-run income
distributions. The model provides a tool which may contribute to the identification
of the most effective actions towards a reduction of economic inequality. We find for
instance that, under certain hypotheses, the Gini index is more affected by a policy
of reduction of the welfare and subsidies for the rich classes than by an increase of
the upper tax rate. Such a policy also has the effect of slightly increasing the total
tax revenue.
Key words: Economic inequality; taxation and redistribution models; income
distribution; welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic inequality among individuals is a longstanding phenomenon which affects, to a
large or small degree, most countries. A certain amount of inequality is unavoidable in a free
market economy, especially at times of strong growth. High inequality levels, however, have
been recognized to be harmful for economic development, to be one of the typical causes
of political instability, and to be often at the origin of several social problems, including
mental and physical diseases (see e.g. [1–3]). Tackling inequality is not an easy task and
is usually supposed to be a matter for economists, sociologists and politicians. The most
effective actions for keeping it under control are probably provided by a proper fiscal system
and by suitably targeted welfare policies.
We think that, to some extent, mathematics can also give a contribution in this direc-
tion. Through conceptual models and numerical simulations it can help to recognize and
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2understand the mechanisms which cause inequality in the first place, and then let it persist.
Mathematical models allow the exploration of different conceivable scenarios and, supported
by real world data, may even suggest suitable concrete policies.
In this paper, without any inappropriate ambition to provide solutions, we formulate
a set of simplified models for the description of the micro-processes of money exchange,
taxation and redistribution in a closed market society. We show the emergence, from these
micro-processes, of collective patterns like the income distribution curve. Our models are
quite flexible and allow to consider different fiscal systems, characterized, for instance, by
different tax rates for the income classes and by different gaps between the maximum and
minimum tax rate. In addition, the models include the possibility that welfare provisions
are specifically weighted for each income class. The focus in this paper is precisely on the
effect of variable taxation and welfare on the income distribution and on its unevenness.
While traditional treatments of these subjects in mainstream economics rely on the as-
sumption of a representative rational agent, our approach fits in with a complex system
perspective. Arguments in favour of such a perspective can be found e.g. in [4–8]. We
look at a population (or society) as a system composed by a large number of heterogeneous
elements - the individuals - and we identify their interactions as the basic ingredients of the
overall process. The observable collective features result from the interplay of these interac-
tions. Accordingly, the system manifests self-organization. Due to its analytical character,
our approach also differs from others which adopt the same interaction-based perspective.
The tools most frequently employed in the study of socio-economic complex systems are
indeed agent-based models, often also in combination with a complex network structure (see
e.g. [9, 10]). Our models are expressed by systems of nonlinear ordinary differential equa-
tions of the kinetic-discretized Boltzmann type. The differential equations are as many as
the classes, distinguished by their average income, in which one divides the population. The
j-th equation (with j = 1, ..., n) describes the variation in time of the fraction xj of individ-
uals belonging to the j-th class, and the modellization of this variation involves stochastic
elements, represented by the presence in the equations of suitable transition probabilities.
These models constitute an evolution of models originally introduced in [11] and then vari-
ously modified (so as to allow the study of different questions) and investigated in [12–15].
The main novelty of the present paper is given by the inclusion in the models of differently
weighted welfare measures, aimed at recognizing ways to prevent an excessive inequality.
3In a way, our models belong to the wide class of Asset Exchange Models [16], sometimes
also called “Yard Sale” models because of their simplified representation of economic inter-
actions. The main purpose of this representation is to emphasize the statistical consequences
of the interactions of a large number of agents. It is well known in statistical mechanics that
certain aggregate features of large ensembles do not depend of the details of the interactions,
but emerge as general consequences of statistics. In view of the universal features displayed
by income distributions in several countries and in different epochs, it has long been sus-
pected that these features arise from some common general mechanism. Asset Exchange
Models could then be regarded as the economical equivalent of the perfect gas model or the
Carnot engine in physics. This position has recently been advocated by Boghosian [17], who
proposed a continuum model and derived, in a suitable limit, a partial differential equation
governing its evolution. An improvement of the model, which was explored in [17] and is
not yet present in our approach, is the introduction of economic “production”, in such a
way that the total income of the society is not constant in time. We observe that the redis-
tribution terms considered in [17] correspond to an income tax independent from the single
interactions, while in our scheme the taxation is both related to the income and applied to
each single transaction, and therefore also includes a valued added tax component.
There are further reasons to believe that kinetic models capture the “game-theoretical”
strategies of the interacting agents much more than their physical origin could suggest. In
fact, it was shown in [18, 19] for two different game-theoretical models, that their large-
numbers averages are equivalent to those of certain statistical mechanics systems. This
suggests that some models of statistical mechanics originally developed to describe ensembles
of inanimated atoms or spins are suitable also for the description of ensembles of individuals
following a strategy, because in both cases the system tends to minimize some objective
function.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section a model family suitable for han-
dling the issue from a complexity viewpoint is introduced. Some key properties of the
family models, and the emergence of the relative aggregate outcomes together with their
features resulting from several numerical simulations are investigated and discussed in the
third section. In particular, comparisons between different models and different policies are
drawn. Finally, in the last section, a summary with a critical analysis is given and further
developments and perspectives are mentioned.
4II. A FAMILY OF MODELS ENCOMPASSING DIFFERENT WELFARE
MEASURES FOR DIFFERENT INCOME CLASSES
A. A general framework
The framework within which the model family can be constructed was first introduced in
[11]. We refer to that paper for a detailed illustration of the stylized micro-scale mechanism
that the framework aims to describe.
Imagine dividing a population of individuals into a finite number n of classes, each one
characterized by its average income, the average incomes being the positive numbers r1 <
r2 < ... < rn. Here, we just recall that also the part of the government (which of course
plays a role in connection with the taxation system) can be described through monetary
exchanges between pairs of individuals, and we emphasize that consequently two kinds of
interactions may take place: the so called direct ones, between an h-individual and a k-
individual, occurring when the first one pays the second one, and the indirect ones, between
the h-individual and every j-individual with j 6= n, occurring on the occasion of the direct
h-k interaction. The indirect interactions represent the transactions corresponding to the
payment of taxes and to the benefit of the redistribution. In short, and we are referring
here to a tax compliance case, in correspondence to any direct h-k interaction, if S (with
S < (ri+1−ri) for all i = 1, ..., n) denotes the amount of money that the h-individual should
pay to the k-one, the overall effect of payment, taxation and redistribution is that of an
h-individual paying a quantity S (1− τ) to a k-individual and paying as well a quantity S τ ,
which is divided among all j-individuals for j 6= n.1 The quantity τ = τk, which is assumed
to depend on the class to which the earning individual belongs, corresponds to the taxation
rate of the k-th class.
The taxation and redistribution processes relative to such a population can be modelled
within the framework provided by the system of n nonlinear differential equations
dxi
dt
=
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
(
C ihk + T
i
[hk](x)
)
xhxk − xi
n∑
k=1
xk , i = 1 , ... , n . (1)
Here, xi(t) with xi : R→ [0,+∞) denotes the fraction at time t of individuals belonging to
the i-th class; the coefficients C ihk ∈ [0,+∞), satisfying
∑n
i=1C
i
hk = 1 for any fixed h and
1 Individuals of the n-th class cannot receive money. Otherwise, they would possibly advance to a higher
class. And this is not permitted in the present context.
5k, represent transition probability densities due to the direct interactions (more precisely,
C ihk expresses the probability density that an individual of the h-th class will belong to the
i-th class after a direct interaction with an individual of the k-th class), and the functions
T i[hk] : R
n → R, continuous and satisfying
∑n
i=1 T
i
[hk](x) = 0 for any fixed h, k and x ∈ R
n,
represent transition variation densities due to the indirect interactions (more precisely, T i[hk]
expresses the variation density in the i-th class due to an interaction between an individual
of the h-th class with an individual of the k-th class). The system (1) accounts for the fact
that any direct or indirect interaction possibly causes a slight increase or decrease of the
income of individuals.
B. Construction of a specific model family
We start by defining certain coefficients ph,k for h, k = 1, ..., n, which express the proba-
bility that in an encounter between an h-individual and a k-individual, the one who pays is
the h-individual. Since also the possibility that none of the two pays has to be taken into
account, the requirement which the ph,k must satisfy is that 0 ≤ ph,k ≤ 1 and ph,k+pk,h ≤ 1.
We take
ph,k = min{rh, rk}/4rn ,
with the exception of the terms pj,j = rj/2rn for j = 2, ..., n−1, ph,1 = r1/2rn for h = 2, ..., n,
pn,k = rk/2rn for k = 1, ..., n− 1, p1,k = 0 for k = 1, ..., n and phn = 0 for h = 1, ..., n. This
choice, among others, was proposed and discussed in [13]. It gives account of a degree of
heterogeneity among individuals belonging to different classes, also in connection with their
interactions with others.
We are now ready to construct a particular family of models. This will be done through
the choice of the values of the parameters C ihk ∈ [0,+∞) and of the functions T
i
[hk](x) :
Rn → R.
As in [11–13], we assume that the only possibly nonzero elements among the C ihk are:
C ii+1,k = pi+1,k
S (1− τk)
ri+1 − ri
,
C ii,k = 1− pk,i
S (1− τi)
ri+1 − ri
− pi,k
S (1− τk)
ri − ri−1
,
C ii−1,k = pk,i−1
S (1− τi−1)
ri − ri−1
. (2)
6We stress that the expression for C ii+1,k in (2) holds true for i ≤ n − 1 and k ≤ n − 1; the
second addendum of the expression for C ii,k is effectively present only provided i ≤ n − 1
and k ≥ 2, while its third addendum is present only provided i ≥ 2 and k ≤ n − 1; the
expression for C ii−1,k holds true for i ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2.
As for the indirect transition variation densities T i[hk](x), we express them as
T i[hk](x) = U
i
[hk](x) + V
i
[hk](x) , (3)
where2
U i[hk](x) =
ph,k S τk∑n
j=1wjxj
(
wi−1xi−1
ri − ri−1
−
wixi
ri+1 − ri
)
(4)
represents the variation density corresponding to the advancement from a class to the sub-
sequent one, due to the benefit of taxation and3
V i[hk](x) = ph,k S τk
∑n−1
j=1 wjxj∑n
j=1wjxj
(
δh,i+1
rh − ri
−
δh,i
rh − ri−1
)
, (5)
with δh,k denoting the Kronecker delta, represents the variation density corresponding to
the retrocession from a class to the preceding one, due to the payment of some tax.
The coefficients wj in (4) and (5) denote the weights here introduced to account for differently
distributed welfare. A conceivable expression for them is given e.g. by
wj = rn+1−j +
2
n− 1
γ
(
j −
n+ 1
2
)
(rn − r1) , (6)
with γ ∈ (0, 1/2]. The effect of the parameter γ is such that the smaller γ is, the larger is
the difference w1−wn. Indeed, w1−wn = (rn− r1) (1− 2γ). And, if for example rj is taken
to be linear in j, wj decreases linearly as a function of j, with the exception of the limiting
case when γ = 1/2, in which wj has the same value for each j = 1, ..., n.
Notice that the effective amount of money representing taxes, which is paid in correspon-
dence to a payment of S(1− τk) and is then redistributed is S τk (
∑n−1
j=1 wjxj)/(
∑n
j=1wjxj)
instead of S τk. This is a technical device, due to the bound on the income of individuals in
the n-th class.
2 In (4), h > 1 and the terms involving the index i − 1 [respectively, i + 1] are effectively present only
provided i− 1 ≥ 1 [respectively, i+ 1 ≤ n]. In other words: the 1o term into parentheses on the r.h.s. of
(4) is present for 2 ≤ i ≤ n; the 2o term into parentheses on the r.h.s. of (4) is present for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
3 In (5), h > 1 and the terms involving the index i − 1 [respectively, i + 1] are effectively present only
provided i− 1 ≥ 1 [respectively, i+ 1 ≤ n]. In other words: the 1o term into parentheses on the r.h.s. of
(5) is present for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1; the 2o term into parentheses on the r.h.s. of (5) is present for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
7To fix ideas, we take S = 1,
rj = 25 j , (7)
τj = τmin +
j − 1
n− 1
(τmax − τmin) , (8)
for j = 1, ..., n, where τmax and τmin respectively denote the maximum and the minimum
tax rate. Still, the value of γ, τmin and τmax have to be fixed. Hence, the equations (1)
describe a family of models rather than a single model. They are well beyond analytical
solutions. But, relevant facts can be understood through simulations. To run simulations,
we take here n = 15.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL FAMILY
We start here by stating three properties which hold true for any model of the family
introduced in the Subsection II B. While for the first two properties an analytical proof
can be provided, the third one is in fact only supported by a number of simulations.
Well posedness of the Cauchy problem. For fixed values of the parameters γ, τmin and
τmax, in correspondence to any initial condition x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n), for which x0i ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, ..., n and
∑n
i=1 x0i = 1, a unique solution x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) of (1) exists, which
is defined for all t ∈ [0,+∞), satisfies x(0) = x0 and also
xi(t) ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., n and
n∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 . (9)
This has been analytically proved in [11] for similar models. The proof therein can be quite
easily adapted to hold true in the present situation as well.
Conservation of the total income µ. For fixed values of the parameters γ, τmin and
τmax, the scalar function µ(x) =
∑n
i=1 rixi, expressing the global (and mean) income, is a
first integral for the system (1). Again, the result can be proved by introducing some slight,
obvious modifications in the corresponding proof in [11].
Uniqueness, for any fixed value of µ, of the asymptotic stationary distribution.
For fixed values of the parameters γ, τmin and τmax, for any fixed value µ ∈ [r1, rn], an equi-
librium of (1) exists, to which all solutions of (1), whose initial conditions x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n)
satisfy x0i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n,
∑n
i=1 x0i = 1, and
∑n
i=1 rix0i = µ tend asymptotically
8as t→ +∞. In other words, a one-parameter family of asymptotic stationary distributions
exists, the parameter being the total income value.
Other properties are directly related to the issue of interest here. They concern compar-
isons between models of the family at hand, characterized by different fiscal systems and
different welfare policies. To quantitatively evaluate the consequences of these differences,
it is useful to refer to indicators as the Gini index G and the tax revenue TR. We first recall
here the definition of these two quantities. Then we will try and see, with reference to some
specific examples, which one among two conceivable policies is more efficient, one of the two
conceivable policies being the adoption of a fiscal system characterized by a suitable spread
between the maximum and the minimum income class tax rates and the other one being the
introduction of suitably weighted welfare measures.
The definition of the Gini index involves the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative
percentage of the total income of a population (on the y axis) earned by the bottom percent-
age of individuals (on the x axis). Specifically, G corresponds to the ratio A1/A2 of the area
A1 between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (the line at 45 degrees) and
the total area A2 under the line of perfect equality. It takes values in [0, 1], 0 representing
the complete equality and 1 the maximal inequality.
The tax revenue is the total amount of tax collected in the unit time and redistributed
as welfare provisions. It is given by
TR =
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
n−1∑
j=1
phk τk
wjxˆj
(
∑n
i=1wixˆi)
xˆhxˆk , (10)
where xˆi denotes the fraction of individuals in the i-th class at equilibrium.
A. Adopting different fiscal systems
Concerning the choice of different fiscal systems, we take into account the possibility of
varying the tax rates, expressed according to the progressive rule (8), by letting τmin and
τmax change. In contrast, we fix here γ = 0.5, which amounts to grant the same welfare to
each class.
The results for a couple of prototypical simulation sets are given next. In each of the two
cases, a random initial income distribution is chosen, subject to the requirement that the
majority of individuals belong to lower income classes.
9Example 1. The value of the total income µ is here equal to µ = 135.00. We consider
different model versions, corresponding to different choices of the minimum and maximum
tax rate τmin and τmax. Letting the situation evolve, we then evaluate the Gini index
relative to the asymptotic stationary distribution. And we evaluate as well the tax revenue
corresponding to this distribution. The outputs are reported in Table I.
τmin τmax Gini Index Tax Revenue
30% 45% 0.368 0.0222
25% 50% 0.361 0.0219
20% 55% 0.354 0.0215
15% 60% 0.347 0.0210
10% 65% 0.341 0.0205
TABLE I: The data in this table refer to models for which different minimum and maximum tax
rate are assumed. The value of the Gini index and of the tax revenue relative to the asymptotic
stationary distribution, which are obtained through the numerical simulations, are given. In all
cases, the initial condition is the same. The value of the corresponding total income is here
µ = 135.00.
Example 2. As in the Example 1 we consider here different model versions, corresponding
to different choices of the minimum and maximum tax rate τmin and τmax. The total income
is µ = 127.65. The outputs are reported in Table II.
τmin τmax Gini Index Tax Revenue
30% 45% 0.378 0.0206
25% 50% 0.370 0.0201
20% 55% 0.364 0.0196
15% 60% 0.357 0.0190
10% 65% 0.350 0.0183
TABLE II: The data in this table refer to models for which different minimum and maximum tax
rate are assumed. The value of the Gini index and of the tax revenue relative to the asymptotic
stationary distribution, which are obtained through the numerical simulations, are given. In all
cases, the initial condition is the same. The value of the corresponding total income is here
µ = 127.65.
The outputs of these and several other simulations can be summarized in the following
statement.
Dependence of the asymptotic stationary distribution on τmin and τmax. The
profile of the asymptotic stationary distribution depends on τmin and τmax. For example, if
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the difference between the maximum and the minimum tax rates, τmax − τmin is enlarged,
while all other data are kept unchanged, an increase of the fraction of individuals belonging
to the middle classes (to the detriment of those in the poorest and richest classes) can be
detected at the asymptotic equilibrium.
B. Adopting different welfare measures
We then consider different model versions obtained incorporating a differentiated welfare
system. Specifically, we let the initial data of the Examples 1 and 2 evolve in correspondence
to systems for which the minimum and maximum tax rates are fixed (and amount in par-
ticular to 30% and 45% respectively). In addition to the model in which the same welfare
provision is guaranteed to each class, we consider, for both cases of Example 1 and Example
2, seven variants encompassing different welfare for different classes. These variants are con-
structed through the choice of different values, ranging from 0.45 to 0.15, of the parameter
γ. Recall that providing the same welfare to each class amounts to taking γ = 0.5.
The results we get are summarized in the Tables III and IV . In these tables, beside the
values of the parameter γ, also the ratios w15/w1 are listed. They express the proportion of
welfare which is granted to individuals of the richest class with respect to that one granted
to individuals of the poorest class.
γ w15/w1 Gini Index Tax Revenue
0.50 1 0.368 0.0222
0.45 0.84 0.363 0.0225
0.40 0.70 0.358 0.0227
0.35 0.58 0.353 0.0229
0.30 0.48 0.349 0.0231
0.25 0.39 0.345 0.0233
0.20 0.31 0.341 0.0235
0.15 0.24 0.338 0.0236
TABLE III: The data in this table refer to models characterized by differentiated welfare policies.
In all cases, the initial condition is the same: it is the same as in the Example 1.
Figures 1 and 2 give a visual representation. The two four-panel-blocks concern asymp-
totic solutions evolving from the same initial data considered in the Examples 1 and 2
respectively. In each such block, the panels in the first row display the asymptotic station-
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γ w15/w1 Gini Index Tax Revenue
0.50 1 0.378 0.0206
0.45 0.84 0.372 0.0208
0.40 0.70 0.368 0.0210
0.35 0.58 0.363 0.0212
0.30 0.48 0.359 0.0214
0.25 0.39 0.355 0.0215
0.20 0.31 0.352 0.0217
0.15 0.24 0.348 0.0218
TABLE IV: The data in this table refer to models characterized by differentiated welfare policies.
In all cases, the initial condition is the same: it is the same as in the Example 2.
ary distribution of the model in which the welfare is given by the formula (6) with γ = 0.45
(on the left) and with γ = 0.15 (on the right). As for the histograms in the second row: that
on the left depicts for each class the difference between the fraction of individuals pertaining
to the model with γ = 0.45 and the fraction of individuals pertaining to the model with the
same welfare for all classes; that on the right depicts for each class the difference between the
fraction of individuals pertaining to the model with γ = 0.15 and the fraction of individuals
pertaining to the model with the same welfare for all classes.
The following can be concluded based on these and similar simulations.
Dependence of the asymptotic stationary distribution on differently weighted
welfare measures. The profile of the asymptotic stationary distribution depends on γ.
When γ decreases and all other data are kept unchanged, at the asymptotic equilibrium an
increase of the fraction of individuals belonging to the middle classes (and, correspondingly,
a decrease of those in the poorest and richest classes) can be detected.
C. Some comparisons and observations
The data of Table I show that the dependence of the Gini index G on the difference
∆τ = (τmax − τmin) is almost exactly linear, see Figure 3, left panel. The regression line
has equation G = −0.0007∆τ + 0.378 (R2 = 0.9991) and this can be expressed by saying
that in order to obtain a 1% reduction of the Gini index, ∆τ must increase by approx. 15%.
This should be compared with the dependence of G on changes in welfare redistribution. For
instance, a linear fit of the data of Table III gives a regression lineG = 0.04(w15/w1)+0.3291
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FIG. 1: Asymptotic solutions evolving from the same initial data as in the Example 1. In the first
row, on the left [resp., on the right] is the asymptotic stationary distribution of the model in which
the welfare is given by the formula (6) with γ = 0.45 [resp., with γ = 0.15]; The histograms in
the second row (scaled differently w.r. to those in the first one) depict the difference between the
fraction of individuals in each class pertaining to two models: these are: on the left [resp., on the
right], the model with γ = 0.45 [resp., with γ = 0.15] and that one with the same welfare for all
classes.
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FIG. 2: Asymptotic solutions evolving from the same initial data as in the Example 2. In the first
row, on the left [resp., on the right] is the asymptotic stationary distribution of the model in which
the welfare is given by the formula (6) with γ = 0.45 [resp., with γ = 0.15]; The histograms in
the second row (scaled differently w.r. to those in the first one) depict the difference between the
fraction of individuals in each class pertaining to two models: these are: on the left [resp., on the
right], the model with γ = 0.45 [resp., with γ = 0.15] and that one with the same welfare for all
classes.
(R2 = 0.9955), see Figure 3, right panel. This means that a 1% reduction of G can be
obtained approx. by a 25% diminution of the ratio w15/w1, which appears to be a far less
“invasive” policy measure (it is a 25% cut in the welfare received from the richest class,
compared to that received from the poorest; the intermediate classes undergo proportional
cuts).
Finally, the data of Tables I-IV show a remarkable decrease in the total tax revenue
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when the gap ∆τ is increased, while the contrary occurs when the welfare for the rich (the
ratio w15/w1) is decreased. This means that in our model the inequality-reduction policy of
“taxing the rich much more than the poor” is not only less efficient than “cutting the welfare
for the rich”, but also leads to a reduction in the government budget and thus possibly to a
loss of jobs.
20 30 40 50
Τmax - Τmin
0.345
0.350
0.355
0.360
0.365
G
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
w15
w1
0.340
0.345
0.350
0.355
0.360
0.365
G
FIG. 3: Left: dependence of the inequality Gini index G on the difference ∆τ = (τmax − τmin)
between the maximum and the minimum tax rate (for the richest and poorest class respectively).
The Gini index decreases almost linearly when ∆τ increases. Right: dependence of G on the ratio
w15/w1 between the welfare provision assigned to an individual of the income class 15 and 1. G
decreases almost linearly when the ratio decreases. These two panels refer to the data and to the
linear fits in the Tables I and III .
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our models are based on a system of differential equations of the kinetic discretized-
Boltzmann kind. Society is described as an ensemble of individuals divided into a finite
number of income classes; these individuals exchange money through binary and ternary
interactions, leaving the total wealth unchanged. The interactions occur with a certain
predefined frequency and several other parameters can also be set, in order to provide a
probabilistic representation as realistic as possible. For instance, we can fix the probability
that in an encounter between two individuals the one who pays is the rich or the poor; we
can make the exchanged amount depend on the income classes (variable saving propensity),
etc. After a sufficiently long time the solution of the equations reaches an equilibrium state
characterized by an income distribution, which depends on the total income and on the
interaction parameters, but not on the initial distribution. We emphasize here that it would
be possible to introduce further heterogeneity in various meaningful ways. For instance,
one could assign specific interaction frequencies to the income classes through additional
coefficients to be inserted in the equations, or introduce a network structure or “behavioral
14
sectors”, which comprise honest taxpayers, occasional tax evaders, etc. (this is the object
of work in preparation, [20]).
The ternary interactions represent taxation and redistribution effects: they express the
subtraction, in correspondence to each binary transfer, of an amount whose percentage (tax
rate) depends on the income classes of the individuals involved in the interaction; and they
define the redistribution of this amount to all other individuals. In the simplest version
of the model the redistribution is uniform. In order to represent a more realistic welfare
system we have introduced in this work a weighted redistribution: the poorest classes receive
a larger part of the total tax revenue, according to a linearly increasing function. This may
describe a means-tested welfare system or a policy of limitation of the “indirect subsidies
for the rich”. We have then investigated the dependence on this redistribution parameter
of the inequality of the society, as measured from the Gini index or from the shape of the
income distribution.
The Gini inequality indices G of the income profiles of our model turn out to be quite
realistic. Actually, we can easily compare “pre-redistribution” values of G (those obtained
when taxation terms are switched off) with the values after redistribution. Detailed real
data for such quantities have recently become available [21]. With a pre-redistribution value
of G of ca. 0.46 for the numerical solutions of Table IV , and a post-redistribution value of
G which varies between 0.34 and 0.38, depending on taxation rates and welfare parameters,
it turns out that we are quite close to the real data of the United States (while, for instance,
economies like Germany and Denmark exhibit a markedly larger redistribution gap).
Still concerning the redistribution aspect, we would like to stress that this aspect is
present also in Asset Exchange Models based on purely physical analogies, but only the
present paper proposes, to our knowledge, a redistribution which can be tuned on the single
income classes, thus simulating the working principle of a real means-tested welfare policy.
In other words, physical analogies can represent well situations where, for instance, particles
dissipate energy through radiation, and the radiation is re-distributed to the whole system;
but it is not possible to tune this redistribution in an arbitrary way.
A further advantage of our model is to allow the evaluation of social mobility [20]. This
cannot be extracted, of course, from the equilibrium income distribution alone, but requires
consideration of the probabilities of class advancement. Our numerical results concerning
social mobility confirm the empirical correlation observed between mobility and equality
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[3, 22]. Using the tunable welfare scheme introduced in this paper, it has even been possible
to find numerically some “equi-Gini lines” in the tax-rates/welfare plane τ -w, i.e. to locate
in the plane of these two variables some continuous lines along which the variation of tax
rates and welfare parameters leave the inequality index constant.
In conclusion, we found that in order to diminish inequality, a policy of reduction of the
welfare and subsidies for the rich classes is more effective than an increase in the taxation
rate gap τmax − τmin. This same policy also has the effect of slightly increasing the total
tax revenue, instead of decreasing it. It therefore avoids potentially painful cuts in the
government budget. The results obtained from these simplified models have clearly a limited
validity, but we believe that they are conceptually interesting and can serve as a basis and
stimulus for further analysis.
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